VENEZUELA 2020 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
While Venezuela is legally a multiparty, constitutional republic, the illegitimate
authoritarian regime led by Nicolas Maduro usurped control over the executive,
judicial, citizens’ power (which includes the prosecutor general and ombudsman),
and electoral branches of government, and stood up a parallel, illegitimate
legislative body alongside the existing elected one. On January 10, 2019,
Maduro’s constitutional term as president ended, but he refused to cede control
based on his claimed “victory” in the 2018 presidential elections, which were
widely condemned as neither free nor fair. On January 23, 2019, Juan Guaido, as
president of the National Assembly, assumed the role of interim president pursuant
to the provisions of the constitution related to vacancies. Maduro, with the backing
of Cuban security force members, refused to cede control over the instruments of
state power, preventing interim president Guaido from exercising authority within
the country despite his constitutional mandate. On December 6, the illegitimate
Maduro regime organized parliamentary elections that were rigged in favor of the
regime, and nearly 60 countries and international bodies publicly declared the
elections were neither free nor fair.
Civilian authorities’ control over the security forces declined and was deeply
politicized. Increasingly unpopular with Venezuelans, the illegitimate Maduro
regime depended on civilian and military intelligence services, and to a lesser
extent, progovernment armed gangs known as colectivos, to neutralize political
opposition and subdue the population. The National Guard--a branch of the
military that reports to the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior, Justice,
and Peace--is responsible for maintaining public order, guarding the exterior of key
government installations and prisons, conducting counternarcotics operations,
monitoring borders, and providing law enforcement in remote areas. The Ministry
of Interior, Justice, and Peace controls the National Scientific Criminal and
Investigative Corps, which conducts most criminal investigations, and the
Bolivarian National Intelligence Service, which collects intelligence within the
country and abroad and is responsible for investigating cases of corruption,
subversion, and arms trafficking. Police include municipal, state, and national
police forces. Mayors and governors oversee municipal and state police forces.
The Venezuelan National Police reports to the Ministry of Interior, Justice, and
Peace. According to its website, the national police largely focused on policing
Caracas’ Libertador municipality; patrolling Caracas-area highways, railways, and
metro system; and protecting diplomatic missions. The national police maintained
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a minimal presence in seven of the country’s 23 states. Members of security forces
committed numerous abuses, and a UN report concluded that there were
reasonable grounds to believe that government authorities and security forces
committed crimes against humanity.
Significant human rights issues included: unlawful or arbitrary killings, including
extrajudicial killings by security forces of the illegitimate Maduro regime and
colectivos; forced disappearances; torture and cases of cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment by security forces; harsh and life-threatening prison
conditions; arbitrary detention by security forces; political prisoners or detainees;
serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; and unlawful interference
with privacy. The regime imposed serious restrictions on free expression, the
press, and the internet, routinely blocking signals and interfering with the
operations of, or shutting down, privately owned television, radio, and other media
outlets. The regime essentially criminalized freedom of speech by declaring
reporting unfavorable to its policies as libel and slander, incitement to violence, or
terrorism, including accurate reporting regarding COVID-19 infection rates. The
illegitimate Maduro regime used violence to repress peaceful demonstrations and
freedom of assembly. The regime and its aligned groups disrupted church
services, attacked churchgoers, and destroyed church property and that of other
nongovernmental organizations and civil society. Citizens were unable to change
their government peacefully through free and fair elections, and there were
restrictions on political participation as well as intimidation, harassment, and abuse
of National Assembly members, including denial of due process and parliamentary
immunity. Pervasive corruption and impunity continued among all Maduroaligned security forces and in other national and state regime offices, including at
the highest levels, which the illegitimate regime made minimal efforts to eliminate.
Other significant issues included trafficking in persons, including forced labor;
violence against indigenous persons; and existence of the worst forms of child
labor.
The illegitimate regime took no effective action to identify, investigate, prosecute,
or punish officials who committed human rights abuses.
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:
a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated
Killings
There were numerous reports that the illegitimate Maduro regime committed
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arbitrary or unlawful killings. Although the regime did not release statistics on
extrajudicial killings, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) reported that
national, state, and municipal police entities, as well as the armed forces and
regime-supported colectivos, carried out thousands of such killings during the year.
The Public Ministry is responsible for initiating judicial investigations of security
force abuses. The Office for Protection of Human Rights in the Public Ministry is
responsible for investigating cases involving crimes committed by public officials,
particularly security officials. There was also no official information available on
the number of public officials prosecuted, convicted, or sentenced to prison for
involvement in extrajudicial killings, which, in the case of killings committed by
police, were often classified as “resistance to authority.”
The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reported
that security forces committed more than 2,000 killings between January and
September, amounting to more than 25,000 such killings since 2014, many of
which “may constitute extrajudicial killings.” The OHCHR called for the
dissolution of one of the deadliest regime security units, the Special Actions Force
(FAES), a specialized national police unit created by Maduro in 2017 to quash
large-scale countrywide protests. Between January and June, FAES committed 25
percent of homicides by Maduro-aligned security forces, according to the NGO
Venezuelan Programs for Education and Action on Human Rights (PROVEA).
FAES’ implementation of the 2015 nationwide anticrime strategy, called the
Operation for the Liberation and Protection of the People, was characterized by
large-scale neighborhood raids conducted by hundreds of security agents.
According to the September OHCHR report, from 2015 to 2017, raids under the
Operation for People’s Liberation resulted in 413 persons killed, sometimes shot at
point-blank range. Human rights NGOs also noted with concern the growing
involvement of the armed forces in these killings.
On August 20, FAES officers shot and killed journalists Andres Nieves Zacarias
and Victor Torres during a raid at the headquarters of Guacamaya TV in Zulia
State. Torres’ father, the director of the television station, stated FAES officers
then seized all of the station’s audiovisual equipment and planted weapons on the
victims’ bodies to simulate an alleged confrontation. Illegitimate regime attorney
general Tarek William Saab called the homicides extrajudicial killings, and four
FAES officers were arrested in connection with the killings.
The illegitimate regime attorney general reported that from 2017 to July, one
officer was convicted of homicide for killings in the context of security operations.
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The regime did not release details on the officer’s conviction or other
investigations of security officers involved in killings. The OHCHR found that
investigations of human rights violations committed by regime security forces
were hampered by its refusal to cooperate, tampering with evidence, judicial
delays, and harassment of relatives of victims. According to NGOs, prosecutors
occasionally brought cases against perpetrators of extrajudicial killings, but
prosecutions often resulted in light sentences, and convictions were often
overturned on appeal. In many cases the regime appeared to be scapegoating lowlevel functionaries while allowing high-level officials who issued the illegal orders
to continue in their positions.
A UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) on Venezuela report
released in September stated that extrajudicial killings were committed by officers
belonging to the military, police, and intelligence services, including in more
recent years by FAES and the National Scientific Criminal and Investigative Corps
(CICPC) officers. The FFM asserted that some high-level authorities had
knowledge of and contributed to the crimes, while others who knew or should have
known of the crimes did not take measures to prevent or stop them. Victims were
typically young men, targeted due to alleged criminal activity, revenge, or
mistaken identity, who were shot and killed in their homes or neighborhoods.
Media and NGOs reported security forces attempted to cover up extrajudicial
killings by planting evidence or altering crime scenes to suggest an altercation or
attempted escape by the victim. The FFM concluded there were reasonable
grounds to believe that authorities and security forces planned and executed serious
human rights violations, including killings, some of which amounted to crimes
against humanity, since 2014. The FFM report also stated there were reasonable
grounds to believe that Maduro and other regime officials either ordered,
contributed to, or were involved in the commission of the crimes and human rights
abuses documented in the FFM report.
b. Disappearance
The NGOs Foro Penal and Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights documented 753
enforced disappearances of political detainees between 2018 and June 2020. An
OHCHR investigation found that almost all individuals detained by the Directorate
General of Military Counterintelligence (DGCIM) were subjected to enforced
disappearances for periods of seven to 40 days after their arrest, raising their risk of
also becoming victims of torture and abuse. The illegitimate Maduro regime
continued to deny requests by the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearances to visit the country to conduct an investigation.
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On March 10, FAES officers detained National Assembly (AN) deputy Renzo
Prieto and two assistants, without a warrant for their arrest, after the three
participated in a protest in support of interim president Guaido. The illegitimate
Maduro regime authorities did not disclose Prieto’s location, nor did they allow
any form of communication between Prieto and his family or lawyers during his
detention. Prieto’s family expressed significant concern for his state of health, due
to an injury that required urgent surgical care and risk of contracting COVID-19.
While in regime custody, Prieto stated he was forced to sleep on the floor in a
frigid, windowless, four-by-eight-foot cell with five other detainees. On August
31, Prieto was released. Prieto previously had been in regime detention from 2014
to 2018, also after participating in a protest, in what the UN Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention concluded was an arbitrary arrest.
The illegitimate Maduro regime arrested AN deputy Gilber Caro in December
2019, his third detention since 2017, and did not reveal his location or permit
contact with his lawyer until January 21. On August 31, he was released.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment
Although the constitution and law prohibit such practices, there were credible
reports that Maduro-aligned security forces tortured and abused detainees.
According to the illegitimate Maduro regime, as of May, 26 individuals had been
convicted of torturing or abusing detainees.
The regime-aligned Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman did not publish
statistics regarding allegations of torture by police during the year. Several NGOs
detailed cases of widespread torture and “cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment.” Human rights groups reported the regime continued to influence the
attorney general and public defenders to conduct investigations selectively and
subjectively. No official data were available on investigations, prosecutions, or
convictions in cases of alleged torture. The NGO Foro Penal maintained that
hundreds of cases were not reported to government institutions because victims
feared reprisal. The OHCHR found that in some cases doctors issued false or
inaccurate medical reports not disclosing signs of torture.
Press and NGOs reported that beatings and humiliating treatment of suspects
during arrests were common and involved various law enforcement agencies and
the military controlled by the illegitimate Maduro regime. Torture and other cruel,
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inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment of prisoners were also reported
during the year. Regime-aligned authorities reportedly subjected detainees to
asphyxiation, electric shock, broken bones, being hung by their limbs, and being
forced to spend hours on their knees. Detainees were also subjected to cold
temperatures, sensory deprivation, and sleep deprivation; remained handcuffed for
extended periods of time; and received death threats to themselves and their
relatives. Detainees reported regime-aligned security forces moved them from
detention centers to houses and other clandestine locations where abuse took place.
Cruel treatment frequently involved illegitimate regime authorities denying
prisoners medical care and holding them for long periods in solitary confinement.
The latter practice was most prevalent with political prisoners. NGOs detailed
reports from detainees who were victims of sexual and gender-based violence by
regime-aligned authorities. The FFM found that regime-aligned security forces,
specifically the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (SEBIN) and DGCIM,
subjected detainees to torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, and
that high-level regime officials committed, ordered, or contributed to the abuses or
were aware of their activities and failed to prevent or stop them.
Foro Penal reported multiple instances of political prisoners denied adequate
medical treatment while in regime custody. Foro Penal noted instances in which
regime authorities transferred detainees to a medical facility, where instead of
receiving treatment, they were interrogated by security officials. PROVEA
identified 574 cases of torture by regime-aligned security forces in 2019, resulting
in the deaths of at least 23 individuals. NGOs reported that members of the
military represented a growing number of victims of torture, such as retired naval
captain Rafael Acosta Arevalo, who died of injuries sustained from torture while in
regime custody in June 2019.
Political activist Vasco Da Costa, who had been detained in the Ramo Verde
military prison despite being a civilian, was released in August 2019 after more
than two years in regime custody. Da Costa described extended periods of torture
at the hands of the DGCIM, including use of electric shocks, simulated drownings,
and beatings to the feet and stomach to the point that he lost control of his bowels.
According to Da Costa, prison guards systematically beat and mutilated detainees
according to the detainees’ occupations, targeting the legs of soldiers, the hands of
a surgeon who was arrested because he was the spouse of a soldier wanted by the
regime, and in the case of Da Costa, his eyes due to his role as an academic.
Impunity was a significant problem in the security forces. Despite continued
reports of police abuse and involvement in crime, particularly in the activities of
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illegally armed groups, including illegal and arbitrary detentions, extrajudicial
killings, kidnappings, and the excessive use of force, the illegitimate Maduro
regime took no effective action to investigate officials who committed human
rights abuses. Corruption, inadequate police training and equipment, and
insufficient central government funding, particularly for police forces in states and
municipalities governed by opposition officials, reduced the effectiveness of the
security forces. NGOs noted that many victims did not report violent crimes to
police or other regime authorities due to fear of retribution or lack of confidence in
police. The regime, backed by Cuban security force members embedded in
Maduro’s security and intelligence services, refused to cede power, preventing the
interim government from taking action.
Prison and Detention Center Conditions
Most prison conditions were harsh and life threatening due to gross overcrowding,
food shortages, inadequate sanitary conditions and medical care, systemic
violence, and poor infrastructure.
Physical Conditions: According to the NGO A Window to Liberty (UVL), prison
capacity was approximately 19,000 inmates for penitentiaries and 5,000 for police
station jails. Conditions were most acute in pretrial detention facilities such as
police station jails. Overcrowding was 172 percent for penitentiaries and 415
percent for police station jails on average, although the NGO Venezuelan
Observatory for Prisons (OVP) noted that in some jails the overcrowding ranged
from 800 to 1,200 percent. Overcrowding and generally unsanitary conditions
placed prisoners at increased risk of contracting respiratory diseases such as
tuberculosis and COVID-19.
There were two women’s prisons, one each in the states of Miranda and Zulia. The
law stipulates women in mixed prisons must be held in annexes or separate
women’s blocks. A local NGO reported that male and female prisoners
intermingled. Illegitimate Maduro regime security forces and law enforcement
authorities often held minors together with adults, although separate facilities
existed. Because institutions were filled beyond capacity, hundreds of children
accused of infractions were confined in juvenile detention centers, where they were
reportedly crowded into small, unsanitary cells.
The CICPC detention facility, police station jails, and detention centers also were
overcrowded, causing many police station offices to be converted into makeshift
prison cells. Long delays in court proceedings and prison transfers created a
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parallel system that held prisoners in police station jails, in some cases for years,
although these facilities were designed to hold individuals only for 48 hours.
Prisoners reportedly took turns sleeping on floors and in office chairs, and
sanitation facilities were inadequate or nonexistent. A UVL study of 248 facilities
holding pretrial detainees revealed 315 percent overcrowding. The UVL also
found that 5 percent of facilities provided medical services, more than 90 percent
did not have potable water, 50 percent did not have regular trash collection or
proper restrooms, and 35 percent lacked electricity.
The National Guard (GNB) and the Ministry of Interior, Justice, and Peace have
responsibility for prisons’ exterior and interior security, respectively. The
illegitimate Maduro regime failed to provide adequate prison security. The OVP
estimated a staffing gap of 90 percent for prison security personnel, with one guard
for every 100 inmates, instead of one for every 10 as recommended by
international standards. Armed gangs, known as pranes, exercised de facto control
within some prisons.
According to the UVL and OVP, between March and August, 287 prisoners died in
prisons and jails, more than double the number compared with the same period in
2018. Some deaths resulted from prison and detention center riots. For example,
on May 1, GNB officers opened fire on prisoners during a riot at the Los Llanos
penitentiary in Portuguesa State, leaving 47 prisoners killed and 67 injured.
Illegitimate regime Minister of Prisons Iris Varela claimed the riot began as an
attempted prison escape, an account disputed by inmates and their family
members, who stated the prisoners were protesting malnutrition. Media reported
the prison, which was designed for 750 prisoners, held at least 2,500 inmates. AN
members called the violence a massacre, and human rights NGOs and the OHCHR
called for an investigation. The illegitimate Maduro regime charged 10 persons for
their involvement in the violence.
The OVP reported inmate deaths due to generally unsanitary and unsafe conditions
prevalent in prisons, with 73 percent the result of tuberculosis and malnutrition.
The OVP reported that due to inadequate nutrition and lack of potable water,
stomach illnesses were common among inmates. The UVL reported that in more
than 90 percent of detention facilities, prisoners depended upon family visits to
supply them with food, water, and medicine. Media reported prison guards
regularly stole food families purchased for inmates. Prisoners were unable to meet
their basic needs when illegitimate Maduro regime authorities suspended family
visits to prisons and detention centers on April 2 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
A study by the NGO Solidarity Action found prison rules resulted in the isolation
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of those with HIV/AIDS in “inadequate spaces without food and medical
attention.” The OVP reported a generalized lack of medical care, drugs,
equipment, and physicians for prisoners. Inmates often received the same pills
regardless of their symptoms, and pregnant women lacked adequate facilities for
medical attention.
Administration: The illegitimate regime’s Ministry of Penitentiary Services did
not respond to requests from the OVP, UVL, other human rights organizations,
inmates, or families regarding inmates or investigations of the harsh conditions that
led to hunger strikes, violent uprisings, and massacres.
Prisoners and detainees generally had access to visitors, including some with
overnight privileges, until authorities suspended family visits in April due to the
COVID-19 pandemic. In some cases prison officials harassed or abused visitors.
For political prisoners, prison officials imposed significant restrictions on visits by
family and legal representation. When allowed access, visitors were at times
subjected to strip searches.
Independent Monitoring: Human rights observers experienced lengthy delays and
restrictions in gaining access to prisons and detention centers. More than 300 lay
members from the Venezuelan Episcopal Conference of the Roman Catholic
Church volunteered in 40 prisons. Although prohibited from formally entering
prisons, Catholic laity visited prisoners on family visitation days. As of September
the OHCHR had conducted 15 visits of 13 detention centers.
d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention
The constitution prohibits the arrest or detention of an individual without a judicial
order and provides for the accused to remain free while being tried, but judges and
prosecutors often disregarded these provisions. The law provides for the right of
persons to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court, but the
illegitimate Maduro regime generally did not observe this requirement. While
NGOs such as Foro Penal, the Committee for the Families of Victims of FebruaryMarch 1989, the Institute for Press and Society, Espacio Publico, and PROVEA
noted at least 2,000 open cases of arbitrary detentions, illegitimate Maduro regime
authorities rarely granted them formal means to present their petitions. Regime
authorities arbitrarily detained individuals, including foreign citizens, for extended
periods without criminal charges.
Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees
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While a warrant is required for an arrest, detention is permitted without an arrest
warrant when an individual is apprehended in the act of committing a crime or to
secure a suspect or witness during an investigation. Police often detained
individuals and raided their homes without a warrant. The OHCHR found that in
several cases the illegitimate Maduro regime issued warrants retroactively or
forged the warrant’s date of issuance. The law mandates that detainees be brought
before a prosecutor within 12 hours and before a judge within 48 hours to
determine the legality of the detention; the law also requires that detainees be
informed promptly of the charges against them. The regime routinely ignored
these requirements.
Although the law provides for bail, release on bail is not afforded to persons
charged with certain crimes. Bail also may be denied if a person is apprehended in
the act of committing a crime or if a judge determines the accused may flee or
impede the investigation. The law allows detainees access to counsel and family
members, but that requirement was often not met, particularly for political
prisoners. The constitution also provides any detained individual the right to
immediate communication with family members and lawyers who, in turn, have
the right to know a detainee’s whereabouts. A person accused of a crime may not
be detained for longer than the possible minimum sentence for that crime or for
longer than two years, whichever is shorter, except in certain circumstances, such
as when the defendant is responsible for the delay in the proceedings. The regime
routinely ignored these requirements.
Arbitrary Arrest: Foro Penal reported 281 cases of arbitrary detention between
January 1 and July 31.
On May 9, illegitimate regime security forces arrested Junior Pantoja, a former city
councilman and soup-kitchen manager, during a violent police confrontation with
armed gangs in a Caracas neighborhood. Pantoja’s relatives and neighbors, as well
as AN, called the arrest arbitrary and politically motivated due to his role as a
community leader. Pantoja’s lawyer claimed security forces planted five bullets on
Pantoja in order to arrest him for gang-related activity and arms trafficking. On
June 24, he was released and on August 23, he died of a respiratory infection after
his health deteriorated while in regime custody.
On October 4, the illegitimate Maduro regime, without providing explanation,
prevented interim president Juan Guaido’s chief of staff, Roberto Marrero, from
boarding a flight to Spain. Marrero had been released from regime custody on
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August 31, following his March 2019 arrest and months of arbitrary judicial
delays. Media reported contradictory and conflicting evidence submitted by
prosecutors--including allegations that rifles and a grenade were planted at
Marrero’s residence on the day of his arrest. Marrero was charged with
conspiracy, treason, and weapons smuggling. Many international entities,
including the Lima Group and the EU, condemned Marrero’s 2019 arrest as
politically motivated.
Pretrial Detention: Pretrial detention remained an egregious problem. According
to the UVL, approximately 70 percent of the prison population was in pretrial
detention. The NGO Citizen Observatory of the Penal Justice System attributed
trial delays to the shortage of prosecutors and penal judges.
Despite constitutional protections that provide for timely trials, judges reportedly
scheduled initial hearings months after the events that led to the detention.
Proceedings were often deferred or suspended when an officer of the court, such as
the prosecutor, public defender, or judge, failed to attend. Prisoners reported to
NGOs that a lack of transportation and disorganization in the prison system
reduced their access to the courts and contributed to trial delays.
Detainee’s Ability to Challenge Lawfulness of Detention before a Court: Detained
individuals may challenge the grounds for their detention, but proceedings were
often delayed and hearings postponed, stretching trials for years. Courts frequently
disregarded defendants’ presumption of innocence. Illegitimate Maduro regime
authorities often failed to allow detainees to consult with counsel or access their
case records when filing challenges. Some detainees remained on probation or
under house arrest indefinitely.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The constitution provides for an independent judiciary, but the judiciary lacked
independence and generally judged in favor of the illegitimate regime at all levels.
There were credible allegations of corruption and political influence throughout the
judiciary. According to reports from the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (IACHR), more than 75 percent of all judges had provisional appointments
and were subject to removal at will by the Supreme Court (TSJ) Judicial
Committee. Provisional and temporary judges, who legally have the same rights
and authorities as permanent judges, allegedly were subjected to political influence
to make proregime determinations. The OHCHR reported that lower courts
received instructions from the TSJ on cases, especially those of a political nature,
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and observed that TSJ decisions related to the AN were inconsistent and raised
concerns regarding politicization. Low salaries for judges at all levels increased
the risk of corruption.
There was a general lack of transparency and stability in the assignments of district
attorneys to cases and a lack of technical criteria for assigning district attorneys to
criminal investigations. These deficiencies hindered the possibility of bringing
offenders to justice and resulted in a 90 percent rate of impunity for common
crimes and a higher percentage of impunity for cases of alleged human rights
abuses.
Trial Procedures
The law provides for the right to a fair and public trial with oral proceedings for all
individuals. By law defendants are considered innocent until proven guilty. The
law requires that detainees be informed promptly of the charges against them, but
the requirement was often ignored and, even when respected, involved dubious
allegations, according to human rights organizations. Defendants have the right to
consult with an attorney. According to the Office of the Human Rights
Ombudsman, there were approximately 1,300 public defenders, but indigent
defendants’ right to free counsel was often not respected because of attorney
shortages. Free interpretation was often not available to defendants. Some NGOs
provided pro bono counsel to defendants.
Defendants may request no fewer than 30 days and no more than 45 days to
prepare their defense. Defendants have the right to question adverse witnesses and
present their own witnesses. By law defendants may not be compelled to testify or
confess guilt. Defendants and plaintiffs have the right of appeal. The OHCHR
documented cases in which the illegitimate Maduro regime prevented lawyers
from meeting with defendants and denied them confidentiality or access to case
files.
Trial delays were common. Trials in absentia are permitted in certain
circumstances, although opponents of the procedure claimed the constitution
prohibits such trials. The law also states that, in the absence of the defense
attorney, a trial may proceed with a public defender whom the court designates.
The law gives judges the discretion to hold trials behind closed doors if a public
trial could “disturb the normal development of the trial.”
On November 8, the TSJ convicted judge Maria Lourdes Afiuni of “spiritual
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corruption,” an offense that does not exist under criminal law, and sentenced her to
five years’ imprisonment. Human rights NGOs and lawyers called the charges
fabricated and an attempt to coerce other judges to take action against opposition
politicians. In 2009 authorities arrested Afiuni on charges of corruption and abuse
of authority for her decision to release a businessman who had been held in pretrial
detention beyond the maximum time prescribed by law. Following her release to
house arrest in 2011, regime-aligned authorities limited her movements and ability
to speak to the press before granting her an unconditional release in July 2019.
The law mandates that municipal courts handle “less serious” crimes, i.e., those
carrying maximum penalties of imprisonment of fewer than eight years. Municipal
courts may levy penalties that include three to eight months of community service.
Besides diverting some “less serious” crimes to the municipal courts, this diversion
also permits individuals accused of “lesser crimes” to ask the courts to suspend
their trials conditionally in exchange for their admission of responsibility,
commitment to provide restitution “in a material or symbolic form,” community
service, or any other condition imposed by the court.
The law provides that trials for military personnel charged with human rights
abuses after 1999 be held in civilian rather than military courts. In addition, under
the Organic Code of Military Justice, an individual may be tried in the military
justice system for “insulting, offending, or disparaging the national armed forces or
any related entities.” NGOs and the IACHR expressed concern with the regime’s
practice of trying civilians under the military justice system for protests and other
actions not under military jurisdiction. According to Foro Penal, since 2014
military courts had processed 870 civilians.
Political Prisoners and Detainees
The illegitimate Maduro regime used the judiciary to intimidate and prosecute
individuals critical of regime policies or actions. Foro Penal reported 351 political
prisoners in regime custody as of December 28, compared with 388 political
prisoners at the end of 2019. The regime routinely held political prisoners in
SEBIN installations or the Ramo Verde military prison without an explanation of
why they were not being held in civilian detention facilities.
On August 31, the illegitimate Maduro regime announced the “pardon” of 110
political prisoners. These pardons were conditional, with regime officials
threatening to rescind the benefit if any individuals “return to any act of terrorism,
violence, or coup mongering,” as arbitrarily determined by the regime. According
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to Foro Penal, however, only 50 of those named were in regime custody at the
time. Of the prisoners, 23 had already been released, and the remaining 37 were
AN deputies either in exile, in foreign embassy asylum in Caracas, or facing
prosecution. Media and NGOs noted that since most on the list were not duly
convicted or even charged with any crime, the move was a dismissal rather than a
pardon. The list did not include any members of the military, although they
represented 20 percent of political prisoners, according to Foro Penal. On
September 7, regime attorney general Tarek William Saab encouraged the released
detainees to participate in the December 6 parliamentary elections, but he warned
they would be rearrested if found to have committed additional “crimes.”
On March 15, SEBIN officers arrested AN deputy Tony Geara. Geara was
charged with financing terrorism and weapons trafficking after he posted
comments on social media noting that a local hospital did not have running water.
Media reported in August that Geara tested positive for COVID-19 while in
SEBIN custody in Bolivar State. On August 31, Geara was released.
On August 28, AN deputy Juan Requesens was released to house arrest after being
detained for more than two years for his alleged involvement in an attempted
assassination of Maduro. International observers criticized irregularities in
Requesens’ trial, which was marred by lengthy judicial delays as well as a lack of
transparency and legal due process.
On October 14, opposition party leader Leopoldo Lopez fled to Spain after more
than one year inside the Spanish embassy in Caracas. He previously escaped
house arrest during mass demonstrations in April 2019, and in May 2019 the
illegitimate Maduro regime issued a warrant for his arrest. Lopez was notably not
included in the August 31 “pardon” of political prisoners.
In 2017 the head of state-owned oil company PDVSA summoned six executives of
U.S.-based subsidiary CITGO to Venezuela for an emergency budget meeting:
U.S. citizens Tomeu Vadell, Gustavo Cardenas, Jorge Toledo, Alirio Jose
Zambrano, and Jose Luis Zambrano and U.S. Legal Permanent Resident Jose
Angel Pereira (collectively known as the CITGO-6). Upon their arrival in Caracas,
they were detained by masked security agents; charged with embezzlement, money
laundering, and criminal association for an alleged deal they signed to restructure
CITGO bonds; and confined in one of the country’s most dangerous prisons. After
their initial appearance before a judge was cancelled dozens of times during three
years, the trial of the six began in August. On November 21, they were convicted
and sentenced as soon as closing arguments concluded to terms of eight to 13 years
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in prison. Their cases were marred by a lack of legal due process and based on
politically motivated charges. The illegitimate regime denied media and human
rights groups access to the trial.
Politically Motivated Reprisal against Individuals Located Outside the
Country
There were credible reports that the illegitimate Maduro regime attempted to
misuse international law enforcement tools for politically motivated purposes as a
reprisal against specific individuals located outside the country. On October 22,
the TSJ issued an extradition request for Ivan Simonovis, former political prisoner
and sitting interim government commissioner for security. The regime charged
Simonovis with the attempted murder of Maduro, treason, terrorism, and weapons
trafficking. Simonovis escaped from house arrest in May 2019 and fled the
country.
Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies
While there are separate civil courts that permit citizens to file lawsuits seeking
damages, there are no procedures for individuals or organizations to seek civil
remedies for human rights abuses.
f. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The constitution provides for the inviolability of the home and personal privacy,
but the illegitimate regime generally failed to respect these prohibitions. In many
cases, particularly regarding the political opposition, regime-aligned authorities
searched homes without judicial or other appropriate authorization, seized property
without due process, or interfered in personal communications. FAES and other
security forces regularly conducted both politically motivated and indiscriminate
household raids. Throughout the year media reports documented raids by security
forces on the homes of opposition party politicians and their relatives.
State surveillance remained rampant, including through the assistance of telecom
regulator the National Telecommunications Commission (CONATEL) and staterun telecommunications provider CANTV. In February 2019 the interim
government created a website for volunteers to participate in the delivery of
international humanitarian aid. CANTV manipulated the Domain Name System to
redirect visitors to a fake website registered to CONATEL that was designed to
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phish visitors’ personal information. Further, telecommunications companies
reportedly assisted the government in monitoring communications of political
opponents. Technical attacks against media outlets appeared to be linked to the
armed forces.
China, through its telecommunications corporation ZTE (Zhongxing
Telecommunication Equipment Corporation), provided the government with the
technology to monitor citizens’ social, political, and economic behavior through an
identity card called carnet de la patria (homeland card). To force citizens to
comply, the Maduro regime made it obligatory to present the card to obtain social
services, including pensions, medicine, food baskets, and subsidized fuel. Citizens
essentially had no choice but to obtain and use the card despite the known tracking
methods. Chinese companies such as Huawei and the China National Electronics
Import-Export Company were also supporting financially and technologically
these surveillance methods.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Expression, Including for the Press
The law provides for freedom of expression, including for the press, but the
combination of laws and regulations governing libel, slander, and media content as
well as legal harassment, physical intimidation of individuals and media, and
executive influence on the judiciary resulted in significant repression of these
freedoms. National and international groups, such as the IACHR, Human Rights
Watch, Freedom House, Inter American Press Association, Reporters without
Borders, and Committee to Protect Journalists, condemned illegitimate Maduro
regime efforts throughout the year to restrict press freedom and create a climate of
fear and self-censorship.
Freedom of Speech: The law makes conviction of insulting the president
punishable by six to 30 months in prison without bail, with lesser penalties for
insulting lower-ranking officials. In 2017 the illegitimate Constituent National
Assembly (ANC) gave final approval to the Constitutional Law against Hate, for
Political Coexistence and Tolerance, which stipulates prison sentences of up to 20
years. While the regime stated the purpose of the law was to “promote peace and
tolerance,” NGOs observed the vaguely written law could be used to silence
political parties, activists, and civil society leaders as well as media outlets and
journalists. Conviction of exposing another person to public contempt or hatred is
punishable by prison sentences of one to three years and fines. Espacio Publico
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reported 795 violations of freedom of expression, including 135 arrests, between
January and August.
The illegitimate Maduro regime threatened, harassed, and arrested journalists,
opposition politicians, and health-care workers for speaking out regarding COVID19 and the response to the pandemic. Espacio Publico documented at least 59
arrests by September for COVID-19 coverage.
On March 17, the DGCIM detained medical doctor Ruben Duarte for publishing a
video deploring the lack of supplies and personal protective equipment (PPE) at
the San Cristobal Central Hospital. In August the NGO United Doctors for
Venezuela reported at least 12 health-care workers were arrested for demanding
PPE. Doctors, nurses, and other health-care professionals, who feared for their
own and others’ safety by working without PPE, reported they also faced regime
repression for failing to appear for work.
Freedom of Press and Media, Including Online Media: The law provides that
conviction of inaccurate reporting that disturbs the public peace is punishable by
prison terms of two to five years. The requirement that media disseminate only
“true” information was undefined and open to politically motivated interpretation.
The law prohibits all media from disseminating messages that incite or promote
hate or intolerance for religious, political, gender-related, racial, or xenophobic
reasons; incite, promote, or condone criminal acts; constitute war propaganda;
foment anxiety in the population or affect public order; do not recognize legitimate
government authorities; incite homicide; or incite or promote disobedience of the
established legal order. Penalties range from fines to the revocation of licenses.
The threat of nonrenewal of operating licenses systematically led to self-censorship
on the part of several media outlets.
Despite such laws, Maduro and the regime-aligned United Socialist Party of
Venezuela (PSUV) used the nearly 600 regime-owned or -controlled media outlets
to insult and intimidate the political opposition throughout the year. ANC
president Diosdado Cabello continued to use his weekly television program to
denounce individual journalists and media outlets.
The law declares telecommunications a “public interest service,” thereby giving
the government authority to regulate the content and structure of radio, television,
and audiovisual production sectors. The law provides that the government may
suspend or revoke licenses when it judges such actions necessary in the interests of
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2020
United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

VENEZUELA

18

the nation, public order, or security. The law empowers the government to impose
heavy fines and cancel broadcasts for violations of its norms; CONATEL oversees
the law’s application.
The illegitimate Maduro regime continued legal actions against high-profile
independent media outlets Tal Cual, El Nacional, El Nuevo Pais, La Patilla, El
Pitazo, and Globovision. Following the shuttering of DirecTV’s operations on
May 19, the TSJ ordered the seizure of all property and equipment of DirecTV and
banned DirecTV’s executives from leaving the country. On August 14, DirecTV
resumed operations, although multiple regime-independent outlets reported
challenges--including veiled threats, outright blocks, and fines--preventing them
from broadcasting freely over DirecTV when service was re-established.
The illegitimate Maduro regime-owned and -influenced media provided almost
continuous proregime programming. In addition private and public radio and
television stations were required to transmit mandatory nationwide broadcasts
throughout the year, including a daily 15-minute news broadcast that provided
reports and summaries of regime activities. Media reported the GNB regularly
barred journalists from covering AN debates and activities. The country’s online
independent newspapers were frequently blocked by CANTV. NGOs noted that
regime-owned internet service provider CANTV also routinely blocked
commercial streaming and web searches during interim president Guaido’s
speeches and during weekly AN sessions. On January 5, CANTV restricted access
to social media on the same day as a leadership vote in the AN, while security
forces blocked lawmakers and media from accessing the premises.
The illegitimate regime arbitrarily detained 28 journalists from January to July,
according to the national journalists’ union.
Media and NGOs reported increased repression and intimidation of journalists
following the emergence of COVID-19. Despite a specific exception permitting
travel for members of the press during quarantine, the illegitimate Maduro regime
limited the freedom of movement of journalists.
On March 21, FAES officers arrested freelance journalist Darvinson Rojas and his
family for inciting hatred. Rojas’ reporting questioned figures published by the
illegitimate Maduro regime regarding COVID-19 cases. On August 2, the
illegitimate regime granted Rojas a conditional release. DGCIM officers arrested
Nicmer Evans on July 13, also for inciting hatred. NGOs and journalists called the
arrest a retaliation against Evans due to his role as the founder and director of news
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site Punto de Corte, which frequently published articles critical of the regime. On
August 31, Evans was released.
The law requires practicing journalists to have journalism degrees and be members
of the National College of Journalists, and it prescribes jail terms of three to six
months for those practicing the profession illegally. These requirements are
waived for foreigners and opinion columnists.
Violence and Harassment: Senior national and state leaders of the illegitimate
Maduro regime continued to harass and intimidate privately owned and oppositionoriented television stations, media outlets, and journalists by using threats, property
seizures, administrative and criminal investigations, and prosecutions. The
national journalists’ union reported 260 attacks on journalists from January to
August. On February 11, regime supporters and colectivos attacked at least 12
journalists covering the return of interim president Guaido from an international
tour. Maduro and illegitimate regime-aligned officials used regime-controlled
media outlets to accuse private media owners, directors, and reporters of fomenting
antiregime destabilization campaigns and coup attempts. Regime officials also
harassed foreign journalists working in the country.
Censorship or Content Restrictions: NGOs noted the illegitimate Maduro regime’s
preference for using legal proceedings, financial sanctions, and administrative
actions against unfavorable news outlets instead of shutting them down outright.
Members of the independent media stated they regularly engaged in selfcensorship due to fear of regime reprisals. This resulted in many journalists
posting articles to their personal blogs and websites instead of publishing them in
traditional media.
The regime also exercised control over content through licensing and broadcasting
requirements. CONATEL acted selectively on applications from private radio and
television broadcasters for renewal of their broadcast frequencies. According to
Nelson Belfort, former president of the Venezuelan Radio Chamber, and NGO
reports, approximately 80 percent of radio stations were in “illegal” status
throughout the country due to CONATEL’s not having renewed licenses for most
radio stations since 2007.
According to the local journalists’ union, print news outlets closed due to the
illegitimate Maduro regime’s economic policies, which made it difficult for
independent newspapers to access foreign currency, preventing many from
purchasing critical supplies and equipment necessary for day-to-day business
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operations. In January, 16 print outlets suspended circulation, generally for lack of
supplies, and at least 200 media outlets had been blocked, censored, or closed by
May.
The illegitimate Maduro regime controlled a large portion of the country’s
businesses and paid for advertising only with regime-owned or regime-friendly
media.
A study by the NGO Institute for Press and Society (IPYS) found that more than
five million citizens lived in “media deserts,” areas that had no access to print,
television, radio, or digital media due to censorship, forced closures of television
and radio stations, and reprisals against journalists. Access to information was
most heavily restricted in border territories and indigenous communities.
Libel/Slander Laws: Regime-aligned officials engaged in reprisals against
individuals who publicly expressed criticism of Maduro or regime policy. Maduro
did not act on his 2017 announcement that he would use libel and slander laws to
“defend his honor” in court against opposition leaders’ allegations that he was
responsible for protest-related deaths. In October investigative journalist Clavel
Rangel was forced to leave the country promptly after publishing an expose on
corruption in Bolivar State. The subject of the report, a businessman with links to
the regime, filed a defamation suit against Rangel, which would have prohibited
her from discussing the case in media or leaving the country.
National Security: The law allows the government to suspend or revoke licenses
when it determines such actions necessary in the interests of public order or
security. The illegitimate Maduro regime exercised control over the press through
a public entity, the Strategic Center for Security and Protection of the Homeland
(CESPPA), established in 2013, which is similar to the governmental entity Center
for National Situational Studies (CESNA) established in 2010. CESNA and
CESPPA have similar mandates and are responsible for “compiling, processing,
analyzing, and classifying” both regime-released and other public information with
the objective of “protecting the interests and objectives of the state.”
During the year Maduro renewed three times the “state of alarm” issued on March
13, citing the COVID-19 pandemic, and granted himself the power to restrict rights
otherwise provided for in the constitution. The 60-day emergency decree, which
by law is renewable only once and requires AN endorsement to be effective,
allows the president to block any action he deems could “undermine national
security” or could “obstruct the continuity of the implementation of economic
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measures for the urgent reactivation of the national economy.” The regime also
threatened, harassed, and arrested journalists, opposition politicians, and healthcare workers for speaking out on COVID-19 and the response to the pandemic.
Nongovernmental Impact: Widespread violence in the country, often encouraged
or left undeterred by the Maduro regime, made it difficult to determine whether
attacks on journalists resulted from common criminal activity or whether criminals
or others targeted media members.
Internet Freedom
The illegitimate Maduro regime restricted or disrupted access to the internet and
censored online content. The illegitimate regime exercised broad control over the
internet through the state-run CONATEL. The China National Electronics ImportExport Company provided the regime with cyber support, technical experts, and a
suite of software and hardware that was a commercialized version of China’s
“Great Firewall” to maintain online censorship, control information, and prevent
the internal dissemination of content deemed undesirable by political leadership.
Free Access, an NGO focused on freedom of expression and social justice,
reported that CONATEL supported monitoring of private communications and
repression of internet users who expressed dissenting opinions online. According
to media reports, users of social networks accused CONATEL of monitoring their
online activity and passing identifying information to regime intelligence agencies,
such as SEBIN. According to Free Access, CONATEL provided information to
SEBIN, including internet protocol addresses, which assisted illegitimate Maduro
regime authorities in locating users.
The law puts the burden of filtering prohibited electronic messages on service
providers, and it allows CONATEL to order service providers to block access to
websites that violate these norms and sanctions service providers with fines for
distributing prohibited messages. As of September the illegitimate Maduro regime
blocked 40 websites and online platforms that contained information regarding
COVID-19.
CONATEL’s director, Jorge Elieser Marquez Monsalve, reiterated the claims of
his predecessors that CONATEL’s role is to enforce the law and prevent
dissemination of illegal information or material unsuitable for children and
adolescents. Nevertheless, the illegitimate Maduro regime continued to block
internet sites that posted dollar- and euro-to-bolivar currency exchange rates
differing from the illegitimate regime’s official rate, as well as cryptocurrency
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exchanges. The regime-controlled internet service provider CANTV facilitated
blockages. According to IPYS and the VE Sin Filtro (VE without Filter) internet
monitoring project sponsored by internet freedom watchdog Venezuela Inteligente,
the regime blocked websites during events of public interest. Social media and
video streaming sites such as Facebook, YouTube, and Periscope were blocked
during the AN’s January 5 session and also during live speeches made by interim
president Guaido throughout the year. In a September 15 televised address,
Maduro denounced the news site Monitoreamos.com as an “enemy” and its
journalists as “manipulators and bandits.” On September 16, internet service
providers blocked access to the site.
Regime-aligned intelligence agencies, which lacked independent oversight,
conducted surveillance for political purposes. Courts relied on evidence obtained
from anonymous patriotas cooperantes (cooperating patriots) to harass perceived
opponents of the illegitimate Maduro regime, and senior regime-aligned officials
used personal information gathered by patriotas cooperantes to intimidate regime
critics and human rights defenders. Users were arrested and criminally accused of
actions such as tweeting information publicly available on webpages.
On August 28, internet providers blocked access to anticensorship tools to prevent
health-care workers from accessing the Health Heroes financial assistance program
announced by interim president Guaido, according to VE Sin Filtro. The group
also found the financial platform used to distribute payments to health workers had
been blocked and the illegitimate Maduro regime launched a phishing campaign
that redirected users to a malicious site in order to capture their data.
Academic Freedom and Cultural Events
There were no substantiated reports of illegitimate Maduro regime restrictions on
cultural events, but the regime imposed restrictions on academic freedom. Aula
Abierta (Open Classroom), a local human rights NGO focused on academic
freedom, reported the regime retaliated against opposition-oriented autonomous
universities by providing insufficient funding and failing to adjust budgetary
allocations to inflation. According to media reports, universities ran deep deficits,
receiving less than 10 percent of the funds they budgeted to cover operating costs.
In 2017 the National University Council, the government’s regulating body for
university education, relinquished its functions to the ANC, disregarding the law
requiring university autonomy. According to Aula Abierta, there were 151
security incidents, including fires, thefts, threats, and violence directed towards
university students, professors, and school property.
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The illegitimate Maduro regime continued to increase its control over local
universities, including the admissions process.
In August 2019 the TSJ ordered the Central University of Venezuela to hold
university elections in six months. The ruling, which applied to eight other public
and private universities as well, stipulated the elected candidate must win in at
least three of the five electoral sectors (teachers, students, graduates, administrative
staff, and laborers) and must receive an absolute majority of votes. Students and
university leaders called the ruling an attack on university autonomy, in violation
of the constitution, and stated it would lead to the installation of regime-aligned
sympathizers heading universities. On February 27, the TSJ announced a
suspension of the ruling. University professors clarified that the suspension only
removed the deadline imposed by the TSJ but left in place the changes to electoral
process and granted the Ministry of University Education the power to oversee the
elections.
On May 8, the Academy of Physical, Mathematical, and Natural Sciences issued a
report that accused the illegitimate Maduro regime of underreporting COVID-19
infections. On May 13, PSUV vice president Diosdado Cabello announced an
investigation into the academy and invited regime-aligned security forces to
summon the report’s authors. Domestic research institutions and international
organizations condemned Cabello’s actions as unacceptable intimidation, and
interim president Guaido denounced the attack on the independence and academic
freedom of researchers.
The illegitimate regime continued its practice, announced in 2018, of educational
financial incentives for holders of the carnet de la patria, a regime-issued identity
and social benefits card provided primarily to regime supporters (see section 3,
Political Parties and Political Participation). NGOs and university students
denounced the use of the card as a discriminatory policy that politicized the
issuance of scholarships and restricted academic freedom.
b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The illegitimate Maduro regime restricted freedoms of peaceful assembly and
association.
Freedom of Peaceful Assembly
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The constitution provides for the right of peaceful assembly, but the illegitimate
Maduro regime generally repressed or suspended it. The law regulates the right to
assembly. Human rights groups continued to criticize the law as enabling the
regime to charge protesters with serious crimes for participating in peaceful
demonstrations. Ambiguous language in the law also allows the illegitimate
regime to criminalize organizations critical of it. Protests and marches require
authorization from the regime in advance and are forbidden within designated
“security zones.” Citizens organized sporadic and often spontaneous small-scale
protests throughout the year to demand basic goods and services such as water,
gasoline, and electricity. The political opposition and civil society organized
marches to support interim president Juan Guaido and demand a transitional
government and new presidential elections. The Venezuelan Observatory of Social
Conflict (OVCS) documented 4,414 protests in the first six months of the year, 221
of which were repressed by regime-aligned security forces and armed groups. The
OVCS documented 129 detentions, 62 injured, and two deaths during protests. An
OHCHR investigation found three cases of torture and a sexual assault of
protesters committed on May 20 by regime security forces in Lara State. Media
reported a group of armed colectivos attacked protesters and journalists gathered at
a protest convened on February 29 by interim president Guaido in Lara State.
NGOs and opposition deputies expressed concern that the illegitimate Maduro
regime used quarantine restrictions as a form of social control to criminalize
protests and silence critics. On May 23, FAES officers arrested Giovanny Meza
and four others during a protest in Sucre State to demand water and electricity.
Meza, who suffered from multiple sclerosis, had a seizure during his hearing.
When the judge ordered a medical examination, doctors found that Meza showed
signs of torture, including five broken ribs. Meza was charged with instigation to
commit a crime, obstruction of public roads, possession of incendiary objects, and
criminal association.
Freedom of Association
The constitution provides for freedom of association and freedom from political
discrimination, but the illegitimate Maduro regime did not respect these rights.
Although professional and academic associations generally operated without
interference, a number of associations complained that the TSJ and the National
Electoral Council (CNE), which is responsible for convoking all elections and
establishing electoral dates and procedures, repeatedly interfered with their
attempts to hold internal elections.
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A 2016 presidential decree directed the Foreign Ministry to suspend international
funding to NGOs when “it is presumed” the funding was used with “political
purposes or for destabilization.”
c. Freedom of Religion
See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at
https://www.state.gov/international-religious-freedom-reports/.
d. Freedom of Movement
The constitution provides for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel,
emigration, and repatriation; however, the illegitimate Maduro regime did not
respect these rights.
In-country Movement: The illegitimate regime restricted the movement of certain
opposition leaders, preventing them from traveling on regime-controlled airlines
and refusing to allow them to board some domestic flights.
The “state of alarm” declared by Maduro in March to limit the spread of COVID19 restricted freedom of movement and suspended social and business activities.
The decree authorized regime-aligned security forces broad latitude and discretion
to enforce the decree and conduct investigations. Media reported the illegitimate
regime employed the armed forces, FAES, and armed colectivos to enforce
quarantine measures. PROVEA documented an excessive use of force in
implementing the lockdown, including arbitrary detentions, beatings, torture, and
humiliating treatment for allegedly failing to comply with quarantine measures.
On March 17, the illegitimate regime suspended all international travel, although it
authorized a number of humanitarian and repatriation flights. On March 16,
restrictions were put in place to prevent travel among different states and cities.
Many countries experienced severe difficulties in repatriating their citizens due to
these restrictions.
Throughout the year high-level regime officials stigmatized returning citizens,
blaming them for rising COVID-19 cases and calling them “bioterrorists” and
“biological weapons.” On July 15, Maduro called on all citizens to report and
apprehend returnees who crossed into the country through unofficial border
crossings.
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The illegitimate Maduro regime required returnees to spend a mandatory two-week
quarantine period at shelters run by the armed forces at the border. Humanitarian
organizations and interim government officials reported overcrowding and
unsanitary conditions in quarantine shelters that increased the likelihood of
COVID-19 transmission. Returnees held in these facilities suffered from
insufficient food, water, electricity, and hygiene items, as well as physical
insecurity that put vulnerable groups, particularly women and children, at risk of
sexual violence and abuse. A COVID-19 diagnostic test was required for release
from the quarantine shelters, but in view of the regime’s limited testing capacity,
several returnees were held for as long as one month. Media reported returnees
were kept from returning to their regions of origin and threatened by armed groups
controlling the shelters not to report the poor conditions.
Media reported regime authorities blocked citizens from returning to the country.
On June 6, the illegitimate Maduro regime adopted measures to limit the number
of citizens returning to the country through the border with Colombia. Migrants
were only allowed to return on three specific days a week, and regime authorities
set a limit of 1,200-1,300 returnees weekly through Arauca, Cucuta, and
Paraguachon. As of September more than 40,000 citizens waited to cross the
border into the country through Cucuta, according to the Organization of American
States (OAS) commissioner-general for the Venezuela refugee crisis David
Smolansky. NGOs reported citizens unable to return to their country faced
uncertain legal and financial statuses and were at high risk of victimization for
crime, trafficking, and gender-based violence by criminal armed groups.
Following the illegitimate Maduro regime’s closure of official ports of entry,
Venezuelans traveling into and out of the country had no choice but to use
informal border crossings (trochas) that largely were controlled by illegal armed
groups. While no official statistics were available, activists and NGOs reported
citizens utilizing the trochas faced significant risks, such as gender-based violence
and human trafficking, including forced labor and sexual servitude at the hands of
criminal groups. Smugglers and human traffickers also sent refugees and migrants
on dangerous sea journeys. In December at least 21 individuals attempting to flee
the country and reach Trinidad and Tobago died when their boat capsized.
Individuals were often subjected to debt bondage or forced to pay a form of
taxation at the informal border crossing to illegal armed groups, increasing the
vulnerability of migrants to labor exploitation, harassment, and sexual violence.
Many were vulnerable to recruitment, sometimes forced, into drug trafficking rings
or illegal and other armed groups.
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See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at
https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.
Foreign Travel: Obtaining a passport became increasingly difficult during the
year. Prospective applicants waited overnight in lines and often did not receive
passports after years of delays. Several applicants reportedly paid several thousand
U.S. dollars to obtain a passport. The illegitimate regime repeatedly seized
passports from journalists, members of the opposition, and AN deputies at ports of
entry without explanation as they attempted to depart the country.
e. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons
Not applicable.
f. Protection of Refugees
The illegitimate regime did not cooperate with the Office of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in providing
protection and assistance to refugees, asylum seekers, and other persons of
concern.
Abuse of Migrants, Refugees, and Stateless Persons: With the refugee status
determination process centralized at the National Refugee Commission
(CONARE) headquarters in Caracas, asylum seekers often waited years to obtain a
final decision. During this period they had to continue renewing their
documentation every three months to stay in the country and avoid arrest and
deportation. While traveling to the commission’s headquarters, particularly
vulnerable groups, including women with young children, the elderly, and persons
with disabilities, faced increased personal risks such as arrest and deportation,
extortion, exploitation, and sexual abuse by regime authorities at checkpoints and
other locations.
Access to Asylum: The law provides for the granting of asylum or refugee status,
and there is an established system for providing protection to refugees.
Access to Basic Services: Asylum seekers without legal residency permits had
limited access to the job market, education, and health systems. The lack of
documentation created significant difficulties in achieving sufficient protection and
long-term integration. Illegitimate regime authorities permitted Colombian
children to attend school but inconsistently granted them diplomas or certificates of
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completion without residency documentation, resulting in high dropout rates for
Colombian children. In 2019 CONARE announced the creation of a border
migration control card for refugees present in the country, similar to the carnet de
la patria.
Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process
The 1999 constitution, the country’s 26th since independence in 1811, provides
citizens the ability to change their government through free and fair elections, but
regime interference, electoral irregularities, unconstitutional appointments of
electors, and harassment and manipulation of voters and candidates restricted the
exercise of this right in the 2018 presidential and municipal elections as well as the
2020 legislative elections.
Elections and Political Participation
Recent Elections: Nicolas Maduro’s illegitimate second term as president began
on January 10, 2019, following flawed presidential elections in 2018 condemned
by the political opposition and international observers as fraudulent and
constitutionally invalid. On January 23, 2019, AN president Juan Guaido invoked
Article 233 of the constitution, which calls on the AN president to assume the role
of interim president in the event of presidential vacancy. In December 2019 media
and AN deputies reported a campaign by the illegitimate Maduro regime to
intimidate and bribe opposition lawmakers to break the opposition’s majority in the
AN. On January 5, the GNB forcibly barred interim president Guaido and
opposition deputies from entering the Federal Legislative Palace to elect the AN
leadership for 2020. PSUV deputies and a small group of independent deputies
aligned with the regime proclaimed Luis Parra, a deputy tainted by corruption
allegations, head of the AN despite the lack of a quorum. Opposition deputies
proceeded to meet at the headquarters of newspaper El Nacional, where they
elected Guaido AN president with 100 votes in favor and zero against, a clear
majority of the 167-member legislature. On May 26, the TSJ issued a ruling
declaring Parra the president of the AN and Guaido “in contempt.”
On June 12, the TSJ unilaterally announced the appointment of a new CNE.
Opposition deputies denounced the move, noting it was AN’s constitutional role to
manage the selection process and election of the five-member CNE through a twothirds majority vote in the AN. The CNE announced two changes to electoral law
on June 30: increasing the number of AN deputies from 167 to 277, in violation of
article 186 of the constitution; and increasing the number of deputies elected by
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political parties, rather than directly by voters, to more than half of all seats, which
violates the 2009 Organic Electoral Law.
On December 6, the illegitimate regime conducted fraudulent legislative elections
that did not meet any minimum standard of credibility. The regime usurped the
TSJ’s legislative powers and illegally appointed members to the CNE; hijacked
political parties through the theft of their brand name, assets, and ballot logos,
including those from the left that challenged the regime’s control of Chavez’s
political legacy; prohibited many political opponents of the regime from running
for office and stripped them of their political rights; kidnapped, exiled, and tortured
opposition politicians; suppressed indigenous political representation; and
arbitrarily increased the number of seats in the AN from 167 to 277. As a result,
electoral and constitutional experts, most independent political parties, and civil
society organizations rejected the process.
The interim government utilized a provision in the constitution to hold a public
referendum, the Consulta Popular, on December 7-12. The Consulta Popular’s
questions focused on rejecting the illegitimate regime’s December 6 farce and
restoring democracy through free and fair presidential and legislative elections.
Participation was open to both citizens in the country and abroad, who could vote
via a secure online platform. In-person voting was also available within the
country.
Political Parties and Political Participation: Opposition political parties and PSUV
dissidents operated in an increasingly restrictive atmosphere characterized by
intimidation, the threat of prosecution or administrative sanction on questionable
charges, and very limited mainstream media access.
The illegitimate Maduro regime regularly targeted AN deputies and other
opposition politicians and their relatives through violence or threats of violence,
arbitrary arrest, politically motivated prosecution, violation of privacy, and
restrictions on movement. Interim president Guaido returned to Caracas from an
international trip on February 11, in defiance of a travel ban on him imposed by the
illegitimate Maduro regime. As he made his way through the airport, Guaido and
his entourage were harassed by regime supporters. Regime security forces and
colectivos detained, assaulted, and seized the vehicles of AN deputies and
journalists attempting to make their way to the airport for Guaido’s arrival. The
DGCIM detained Juan Jose Marquez, Guaido’s uncle and an airline pilot who
accompanied Guaido on his return flight, charging him with attempted smuggling
of explosives, bulletproof vests, and subversive material into the country. AN and
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international organizations rejected the accusation, calling Marquez’ arbitrary
arrest an attempt to intimidate Guaido. Marquez was released to house arrest on
June 2.
Between March 26 and April 2, security forces aligned with the illegitimate
Maduro regime arbitrarily arrested four Guaido staffers and the girlfriend of a fifth
staffer, whom they beat, stripped naked, and threatened with sexual abuse.
On April 30, Maduro announced operations “Tun-Tun” and “Bolivarian Fury” to
arrest those involved in an alleged plot to overthrow Maduro. Illegitimate regimesponsored colectivos responded to the call by harassing and intimidating AN
deputies, journalists, and their family members by sending threatening text
messages and spray-painting their homes.
The illegitimate Maduro regime used its control over the TSJ to coopt or dismantle
political parties not aligned with the regime. On May 25, regime attorney general
Tarek William Saab requested that the TSJ declare opposition party Popular Will,
Guaido’s former party, a “criminal organization for terrorist purposes.” During the
year the TSJ unilaterally replaced the leadership of 11 political parties, including
three of the largest opposition parties and four leftist parties that broke with the
regime.
Throughout the year GNB forces denied or limited access by AN members to the
federal legislative palace during regularly scheduled parliamentary sessions. By
June the regime-controlled TSJ had removed the parliamentary immunity of 29
deputies, without following constitutional requirements or due process, prompting
many to go into hiding or exile to avoid arbitrary arrest.
During the year the illegitimate Maduro regime expanded the carnet de la patria
program, introduced in 2017 as a multipurpose identification card required to
access regime-funded social services. To qualify for the card, applicants must
provide proof of political affiliation and respond to questions regarding the social
service benefits they receive. The card amounted to social control, a tool to
leverage access to scarce subsidized consumer products in return for political
loyalty. For example, media reported the regime used the card to prioritize testing
and distribute medical and financial assistance during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Participation of Women and Members of Minority Groups: No law limits
participation of women or members of minority groups in the political process, and
they did participate.
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Section 4. Corruption and Lack of Transparency in Government
The law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials, but the illegitimate
Maduro regime did not implement the law effectively. Several officials explicitly
acknowledged corruption as a major problem. The illegitimate regime frequently
investigated, prosecuted, and detained political opponents on corruption charges to
harass, intimidate, or imprison them. According to Transparency International,
among the main reasons for the country’s widespread corruption were impunity,
weak institutions, and a lack of transparency in the management of government
resources.
Corruption: According to illegitimate regime attorney general Tarek William
Saab, 1,741 persons had been convicted of corruption-related charges since 2018.
The regime, however, did not provide information regarding the alleged cases or
persons convicted.
Corruption was a major problem in all security and armed forces, whose members
were generally poorly paid and minimally trained. There were no data publicly
available on the number of cases involving police and military officials during the
year, although the Public Ministry publicized several individual cases against
police officers for soliciting bribes and other corrupt activities. On April 10, the
Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project published an investigative
report detailing corruption in the military. Using a cache of internal army
documents, the report documented the exploits of illegitimate regime defense
minister Vladimir Padrino Lopez, his businesses in a foreign country under the
names of his family members, and 35 high-ranking officers who benefited from
corruption and lucrative state contracts.
Financial Disclosure: The law requires public officials, as well as all directors and
members of the boards of private companies, to submit sworn financial disclosure
statements. By law the Public Ministry and competent criminal courts may require
such statements from any other persons when circumstantial evidence arises during
an investigation.
Section 5. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights
A variety of independent domestic and international human rights groups generally
operated with restrictions from the illegitimate Maduro regime. Major domestic
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human rights NGOs conducted investigations and published their findings on
human rights cases. Regime officials were rarely cooperative or responsive to their
requests. Domestic NGOs reported fear the regime would use the 2017 Law
against Hate to justify widespread repression of their activities, jailing of the
participants and organizers, and threats against family members. Some domestic
NGOs reported threats against and harassment of their leaders, staff, and
organizations, in addition to raids and detentions, but they were able to publish
dozens of reports during the year. Some human rights activists reported regime
authorities barred them from traveling abroad or that they feared not being able to
return to the country if they traveled. NGOs played a significant role in informing
citizens and the international community regarding alleged abuses and key human
rights cases.
NGOs noted the illegitimate Maduro regime created a dangerous atmosphere for
them to operate. The PSUV first vice president and ANC president, Diosdado
Cabello, used his weekly talk show to intimidate NGO staff of Espacio Publico,
PROVEA, and Foro Penal. Several organizations, such as the OVP, PROVEA,
Foro Penal, and Citizen Control, reported their staffs received both electronic and
in-person threats. Human rights organizations claimed they were subject to
frequent internet hacking attacks and attempts to violate their email privacy.
Multiple humanitarian NGOs were targeted by the regime, which issued politically
motivated arrest warrants against their staff and directors, raided their facilities,
and stole computers and other electronic devices.
The 2010 law prohibits domestic NGOs from receiving funds from abroad if they
have a “political intent,” defined as the intent to “promote, disseminate, inform, or
defend the full exercise of the political rights of citizens” or to “defend political
rights.” The illegitimate Maduro regime attempted to discredit and threatened
NGOs with criminal investigations for allegedly illegally accepting foreign funds.
Various regime officials accused human rights organizations on national television
and other media of breaking the law by receiving funding from international
donors. On February 19, Cabello announced the ANC would revise laws
governing NGOs that receive funding from foreign sources for sanctions to “the
maximum extent possible.” Cabello singled out PROVEA for “destabilizing
Venezuela.” NGOs and the OHCHR reported the regime refused or significantly
delayed legal registration of NGOs, preventing them from receiving international
funding. On November 20, Sudeban--a banking authority affiliated with the
regime--directed all banks to strengthen monitoring of NGO operations in the
country to detect potential illicit activity.
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The law stipulates monetary penalties, a potential five- to eight-year
disqualification from running for political office, or both. The law defines political
organizations as those involved in promoting citizen participation, exercising
control over public offices, or promoting candidates for public office. Although
the law was not enforced, its existence created a climate of fear among human
rights NGOs and a hesitancy to seek international assistance.
In addition to the restrictions placed on fund raising, domestic NGOs also faced
regulatory limitations on their ability to perform their missions. The law includes
provisions eliminating the right of human rights NGOs to represent victims of
human rights abuses in legal proceedings. The law provides that only the public
defender and private individuals may file complaints in court or represent victims
of alleged human rights abuses committed by public employees or members of
security forces.
The United Nations or Other International Bodies: The illegitimate Maduro
regime was generally hostile toward international human rights bodies and
continued to refuse to permit a visit by the IACHR, which last visited the country
in 2002. In 2019 the regime and the OHCHR signed a memorandum of
understanding that provided for the presence of two UN human rights officers for
one year, which was extended for another year in September. The illegitimate
Maduro regime failed to implement recommendations issued by the OHCHR, such
as the dissolution of FAES, which the OHCHR and an independent UN FFM
found reasonable grounds to believe committed extrajudicial killings. In 2019 the
UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution to establish a one-year FFM to
investigate “extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances, arbitrary arrests,
torture, and other cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment committed in Venezuela
since 2014.” In September the FFM reported there were reasonable grounds to
believe that crimes against humanity had been committed since 2014 and the
illegitimate Maduro regime either ordered, contributed to, or was involved in the
commission of these crimes. On October 6, the UN Human Rights Council voted
to extend the mandates of the FFM and the OHCHR for an additional two years.
The OAS passed resolutions citing the continued deterioration of human rights
conditions in the country, and in its October 21 General Assembly resolution, it
welcomed the UN’s FFM report while calling for the “immediate and complete
implementation of the recommendations contained therein, including the
investigation of human rights violations and the cessation of the use of excessive
force, extrajudicial executions, forced disappearances, arbitrary detention, and
torture.”
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Government Human Rights Bodies: Throughout the year the illegitimate regime
gave its 2016-19 human rights plan minimal attention, with no announcements to
renew or update the plan.
The TSJ continued to hold the AN in “contempt” status, which diminished the
purview and operational effectiveness of the assembly’s subcommission on human
rights.
Section 6. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons
Women
Rape and Domestic Violence: The law criminalizes rape of men or women,
including spousal rape, making it punishable if convicted by a prison term of eight
to 14 years. A man may legally avoid punishment by marrying (before he is
sentenced) the person he raped. The law allows authorities to consider alternative
forms of punishment, including work release, for those convicted of various
crimes, including rape, if they have completed three-quarters of their sentence.
The law criminalizes physical, sexual, and psychological violence in the home or
community and at work, with increased penalties for intimate partner violence.
The law punishes perpetrators of domestic violence with penalties for conviction
ranging from six to 27 months in prison. The law requires police to report
domestic violence to judicial authorities and obligates hospital personnel to notify
authorities when admitting patients who are victims of domestic abuse. Police
generally were reluctant to intervene to prevent domestic violence and were not
properly trained to handle such cases. The law also establishes women’s bureaus
at local police headquarters and tribunals specializing in gender-based violence,
and two-thirds of states had specialized courts. The Public Ministry’s Women’s
Defense Department employed a team of lawyers, psychiatrists, and other experts
who dealt exclusively with cases of femicide, gender-related violence, and other
crimes against women.
The illegitimate Maduro regime did not publish statistics on gender-based
violence. The OHCHR reported a lack of due diligence in investigations of
gender-based violence cases. According to NGOs, government efforts to protect
victims of gender-based violence were ineffective or nonexistent. Enforcement of
laws and access to justice were limited, as victims of gender-based violence
reported a lack of progress and inability to follow up on cases after filing reports
with authorities.
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Many advocates observed there was a lack of public awareness among women
regarding resources and support available to prevent and combat domestic
violence. There were five shelters for victims of gender-based violence, most of
which struggled to operate effectively due to a lack of financial resources. NGOs
provided the majority of domestic abuse support services.
NGOs and media reported an increase of domestic abuse and gender-based
violence during the COVID-19 pandemic. The NGO Woman Your Voice Has
Power reported a 52 percent increase in domestic violence during the year.
Between January and October, the NGO Utopix documented 217 femicides and an
atmosphere of impunity for domestic abusers. On August 15, Mariana Lilibeth
Gonzalez was assaulted in her home and shot 30 times. No suspects were arrested
in connection with her death.
Sexual Harassment: Sexual harassment is illegal and punishable by fines and a
prison sentence of one to three years. Although allegedly common in the
workplace, sexual harassment cases were rarely reported.
Coercion in Population Control: There were no reports of coerced abortion or
involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities.
Discrimination: Women enjoy the same legal status and rights as men under the
constitution. Women and men are legally equal in marriage, and the law provides
for gender equality in exercising the right to work. The law specifies that
employers must not discriminate against women with regard to pay or working
conditions. According to the Ministry of Labor and the Confederation of Workers,
regulations protecting women’s labor rights were enforced in the formal sector,
although according to the World Economic Forum, women earned 36 percent less
on average than men doing comparable jobs.
Children
Birth Registration: Citizenship is derived by birth within the country’s territory.
According to UNICEF, 81 percent of children younger than five were registered at
birth, based on 2011 statistics provided by the government. The children’s rights
NGO Cecodap reported that families struggled to register births due to quarantine
measures surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic.
Child Abuse: According to UNICEF and NGOs working with children and
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women, child abuse, including incest, occurred but were rarely reported. The
illegitimate regime made efforts to detain and prosecute some perpetrators of child
abuse. Although the judicial system acted to remove children from abusive
households, the press reported public facilities for such children were inadequate.
According to NGOs, in many cases children were returned to their homes without
proper reintegration measures or follow-up. A study by the NGO Save the
Children found a 30 percent increase in child abuse in homes under quarantine.
Child, Early, and Forced Marriage: The legal minimum age for marriage is 18 for
women and men, but with parental consent the minimum age is 16.
Sexual Exploitation of Children: By law conviction of having sexual relations
with a minor younger than 13, with an “especially vulnerable” person, or with a
minor younger than 16 when the perpetrator is a relative or guardian are punishable
with a mandatory sentence of 15 to 20 years’ imprisonment. The law prohibits the
forced prostitution and corruption of minors. Penalties range from 15 to 20 years’
imprisonment in cases of forced labor and some forms of sex trafficking of women
and girls. The law requires a demonstration of force, fraud, or coercion to
constitute child sex trafficking. The law prohibits the production and sale of child
pornography and establishes penalties of 16 to 20 years’ imprisonment.
Displaced Children: Children’s rights advocates and media reported an increase in
the number of abandoned children living on the street. Cecodap estimated that as
many as one million minors had been left behind with family members as their
parents fled the country’s economic crisis, many of whom also struggled with the
country’s economic downturn. These children resided in limbo, since their parents
who left were unable legally to transfer guardianship to a third party.
State-run facilities, already filled to capacity, were unable to support the influx of
children in need. Private institutions denounced the illegitimate regime’s refusal to
provide subsidized food benefits to support the country’s population. NGOs noted
young girls made up close to one-half of the children living on the streets. This
significant shift posed particular challenges for shelters, which historically housed
predominantly male populations. With institutions filled to capacity, hundreds of
children accused of infractions, such as curfew violations, were confined in
inadequate juvenile detention centers.
International Child Abductions: The country is a party to the 1980 Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. See the
Department of State’s Annual Report on International Parental Child Abduction at
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https://www.travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/International-Parental-ChildAbduction/for-providers/legal-reports-and-data/reported-cases.html.
Anti-Semitism
The Confederation of Israelite Associations in Venezuela estimated there were
9,000 Jews in the country.
Jewish community leaders expressed concern regarding anti-Semitic statements
made by high-level regime-aligned officials and anti-Semitic pieces in proregime
media outlets. They stated regime-owned or -associated media and supporters of
the illegitimate regime promoted Zionist conspiracy theories and denied or
trivialized the Holocaust.
The community leaders noted many other anti-Semitic incidents occurred during
the year. There were reports of societal abuses or discrimination based on
religious affiliation, belief, or practice, including anti-Semitism.
Trafficking in Persons
See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at
https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.
Persons with Disabilities
The law prohibits discrimination against persons with physical and mental
disabilities, but the illegitimate regime did not implement the law, inform the
public of it, or combat societal prejudice against persons with disabilities. The law
requires that all newly constructed or renovated public parks and buildings provide
access, but persons with disabilities had minimal access to public transportation,
and ramps were almost nonexistent. Many persons with disabilities expressed
concerns that public transportation workers often were unwilling to transport them
and forced them to find taxis, which were often unaffordable and frequently not
equipped to support patrons with disabilities. NGOs reported hospitals lacked
infrastructure to accommodate persons with mobility problems and staff to
communicate with deaf persons. Parents of children with disabilities also
complained they were forced to wait in long lines for services rather than receiving
preference as is afforded by law. Online resources and access to information were
generally available to persons with disabilities, although access to closed-captioned
or audio-described online videos for persons with sight and hearing disabilities was
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limited. Separately, leading advocates for persons with hearing disabilities
lamented difficult access to public services due to a lack of interpreters in public
courts, health-care facilities, and legal services, as well as a lack of other public
accommodations.
The National Commission for Persons with Disabilities, an independent agency
affiliated with the Ministry for Participation and Social Development, advocated
for the rights of persons with disabilities and provided medical, legal, occupational,
and cultural programs. According to the commission, fewer than 20 percent of
persons with disabilities who registered with regime health programs were fully
employed.
Children with disabilities attended specialized schools and integrated classes with
their peers without disabilities. Media reported that schools for children with
disabilities suffered from underfunding, decaying infrastructure, and little
consideration for the specific needs of individual disabilities. Parents of children
with disabilities reported significant difficulties in school enrollment, which
prevented their children from receiving formal education. On March 16, the
illegitimate Maduro regime closed the country’s schools through the calendar year
due to the COVID-19 pandemic. NGOs reported that in the shift to online classes,
children with disabilities had limited access to educational materials and the
Ministry of Education did not adapt curricula for children with disabilities. A June
study by the NGO Deaf Confederation of Venezuela found that nearly 90 percent
of children with disabilities decreased their educational activities during the
quarantine.
Members of National/Racial/Ethnic Minority Groups
The constitution prohibits discrimination based on race. The law prohibits all
forms of racial discrimination and provides for a maximum of three years’
imprisonment for acts of racial discrimination. As mandated by law, signage
existed outside commercial and recreational establishments announcing the
prohibition against acts of racial discrimination. Beyond signage the illegitimate
regime did little to enforce laws against discrimination or prosecute cases of
discrimination.
Indigenous People
The law prohibits discrimination based on ethnic origin. The constitution provides
for three seats in the AN for deputies of indigenous origin to “protect indigenous
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communities and their progressive incorporation into the life of the nation,” but
some indigenous communities continued without representation in the national
legislature due to the TSJ’s annulment of the 2015 election of Amazonas State’s
indigenous representatives.
NGOs and the press reported local political authorities seldom took account of
indigenous interests when making decisions affecting indigenous lands, cultures,
traditions, or allocation of natural resources. Indigenous groups continued to call
for faster implementation of the demarcation process.
Indigenous groups and NGOs expressed concern regarding mining in the
expanding “Arco Minero,” an area that extends between the states of Bolivar and
Amazonas. Indigenous communities reported the illegitimate Maduro regime
developed and expanded mining zones without consulting those native to the
region, resulting in a rise in environmental degradation, water contamination, and
malaria. Illegal armed groups, including the National Liberation Army and
dissidents of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia had a considerable
presence in the area, increasing the level of violence and insecurity in the
communities. There was also an unprecedented influx of disease; drugs; human
trafficking, including prostitution and forced labor; and other illegal activities in
the mining areas, putting indigenous communities at risk.
Indigenous groups regularly reported violent conflicts with miners and cattle
ranchers regarding land rights. There were reports of harassment, attacks, and
forced evictions against indigenous persons living in areas included as part of
illegitimate regime mining concessions. Indigenous reported a lack of consultation
by the illegitimate Maduro regime on the social and environmental impact of
mining activity in indigenous and protected areas.
Border disputes with Colombia affected indigenous groups living in border
regions. There were many reported cases in which movements of indigenous
groups were restricted, including from border closures in February.
NGOs stated that quarantine measures imposed by the illegitimate Maduro regime
unduly impacted indigenous communities, preventing transit to and through
territories and making it impossible for indigenous persons to obtain food, water,
and access to medical care. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs reported that 325 persons, 82 of whom were Wayuu, were forcibly
displaced between January and August by armed groups.
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Media reported that in Zulia on April 12, GNB members used tear gas and rubber
bullets to disperse a group of indigenous Wayuu, primarily older women and
children, who were protesting a lack of food and water. Media reported that a
Wayuu teacher was injured when she was shot in the face during the confrontation.
On July 24, the CNE abolished the system of direct, confidential voting of
indigenous representatives to the AN. In August the CNE reversed course again to
allow secret voting but opted to maintain the introduction of “community
assemblies,” which would elect an unspecified number of spokespersons, who in
turn would elect AN representatives. The AN and indigenous activists criticized
the regulations as unconstitutional and an infringement of indigenous autonomy
and the right to self-determination.
Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual
Orientation and Gender Identity
Local police and private security forces allegedly prevented lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) persons from entering malls, public parks, and
recreational areas. NGOs reported the illegitimate Maduro regime systematically
denied legal recognition to transgender and intersex persons by preventing them
from obtaining identity documents required for accessing education, employment,
housing, and health care. This vulnerability often led transgender and intersex
persons to become victims of human trafficking or prostitution.
NGOs reported incidents of bias-motivated violence against LGBTI persons.
Reported incidents were most prevalent against transgender individuals. Leading
advocates noted that law enforcement authorities often did not properly investigate
to determine whether crimes were bias motivated.
The constitution provides for equality before the law of all persons and prohibits
discrimination based on “sex or social condition,” but it does not explicitly prohibit
discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity. According to a TSJ
ruling, no individual may be subjected to discrimination because of sexual
orientation, but the ruling was rarely enforced.
HIV and AIDS Social Stigma
The law provides for the equal rights of persons with HIV or AIDS and their
families. Nevertheless, leading advocates alleged discrimination against such
persons. PROVEA reported that hospitals discriminated against persons with HIV.
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On September 7, FAES officers raided the headquarters of Solidarity Action, an
NGO that advocates for the rights of those with HIV and AIDS, seizing medication
and detaining eight persons.
Section 7. Worker Rights
a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining
The law provides that all private- and public-sector workers (except members of
the armed forces) have the right to form and join unions of their choice, and it
provides for collective bargaining and the right to strike. The law, however, places
several restrictions on these rights, and the illegitimate Maduro regime deployed a
variety of mechanisms to undercut the rights of independent workers and unions.
Minimum membership requirements for unions differ based on the type of union.
Forming a company union requires a minimum of 20 workers; forming a
professional, industrial, or sectoral union in one jurisdiction requires 40 workers in
the same field; and forming a regional or national union requires 150 workers. Ten
persons may form an employee association, a parallel type of representation the
illegitimate regime endorsed and openly supported.
The law prohibits “any act of discrimination or interference contrary to the
exercise” of workers’ right to unionize. The law requires all unions to provide the
Ministry of Labor a membership roster that includes the full name, home address,
telephone number, and national identification number for each union member. The
ministry reviews the registration and determines whether the union fulfilled all
requirements. Unions must submit their registration application by December 31
of the year the union forms; if not received by the ministry or if the ministry
considers the registration unsatisfactory, the union is denied the ability to exist
legally. The law also requires the presence of labor inspectors to witness and
legitimize unions’ decisions before the Ministry of Labor. The International Labor
Organization (ILO) raised concerns regarding the ministry’s refusal to register
trade union organizations.
By law employers may negotiate a collective contract only with unions that
represent the majority of their workers. Minority organizations may not jointly
negotiate in cases where no union represents an absolute majority. The law also
restricts unions’ ability to administer their activities. For example, the CNE has
the authority to administer internal elections of labor unions, federations, and
confederations. By law elections must be held at least every three years. If CNEadministered and -certified elections are not held within this period, the law
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prohibits union leaders from representing workers in negotiations or engaging in
anything beyond administrative tasks. The ILO repeatedly found cases of
interference by the CNE in trade union elections, and since 1999 it has called for
delinking the CNE from the union election process.
The law recognizes the right of all public- and private-sector workers to strike,
subject to conditions established by law. Workers participating in legal strikes
receive immunity from prosecution, and their time in service may not be reduced
by the time engaged in a strike. The law requires that employers reincorporate
striking workers and provides for prison terms sufficient to deter violations for
employers who fail to do so. Replacement workers are not permitted during legal
strikes. The law prohibits striking workers from paralyzing the production or
provision of essential public goods and services, but it defines “essential services”
more broadly than ILO standards. The ILO called on Venezuela to amend the law
to exclude from the definition of “essential services” activities “that are not
essential in the strict sense of the term…so that in no event may criminal sanctions
be imposed in cases of peaceful strikes.”
The minister of labor may order public- or private-sector strikers back to work and
submit their disputes to arbitration if a strike “puts in immediate danger the lives or
security of all or part of the population.” Other legal provisions establish criminal
penalties for exercising the right to strike in certain circumstances. For example,
anyone who “organizes, supports, or instigates the realization of activities within
security zones that are intended to disturb or affect the organization and
functioning of military installations, public services, industries and basic [i.e.,
mining] enterprises, or the socioeconomic life of the country” could be punished
with five to 10 years in prison if convicted. The law also provides for prison terms
sufficient to deter violations by those who restrict the distribution of goods and
“those…who develop or carry out actions or omissions that impede, either directly
or indirectly, the production, manufacture, import, storing, transport, distribution,
and commercialization of goods.” There was no information on whether penalties
were sufficient to deter violations.
The illegitimate Maduro regime restricted the freedom of association and the right
to collective bargaining through administrative and legal mechanisms. The regime
did not effectively enforce the law, and penalties were not commensurate with
those for other laws involving denial of civil rights, such as discrimination.
The ILO raised concerns regarding violence against trade union members and
intimidation of the Associations of Commerce and Production of Venezuela by the
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illegitimate regime. In 2018 ILO member countries voted to establish an ILO
Commission of Inquiry (COI) for Venezuela to investigate longstanding
complaints first filed in 2015 of labor rights violations of ILO Conventions Nos.
26, 87, and 144, which pertain to minimum-wage fixing, freedom of association
and protection of the right to organize, and tripartite consultation, respectively. In
2019 the commission submitted its report to the ILO director general, noting the
illegitimate regime had repeatedly committed violations of international
conventions on minimum wage, freedom of association and the right to organize,
and labor standards. The report also called for “the immediate release of any
employer or trade unionist who may be in prison as a result of carrying out the
legitimate activities of their workers’ or employers’ organization.” In late October
the illegitimate Maduro regime rejected the ILO COI recommendations from 2019
on egregious labor violations.
Organized labor activists continued to report that the annual requirement to provide
the Ministry of Labor a membership roster was onerous and infringed on freedom
of association. They alleged the ministry removed member names from the rosters
for political purposes, particularly if members were not registered voters on the
CNE’s rolls. Labor leaders also criticized the laborious and costly administrative
process of requesting CNE approval for elections and subsequent delays in the
CNE’s recognition of such union processes. In addition there reportedly was a
high turnover of ministry contractors, resulting in a lack of timely follow-through
on union processes. Labor unions in both the private and public sectors noted long
delays in obtaining CNE concurrence to hold elections and in receiving
certification of the election results, which hindered unions’ ability to bargain
collectively.
The illegitimate Maduro regime continued to support many “parallel” unions,
which sought to dilute the membership and effectiveness of traditional independent
unions. The regime excluded from consideration other, independent union
federations, including the Confederation of Venezuelan Workers, General
Confederation of Venezuelan Workers, Confederation of Autonomous Unions of
Venezuela, and National Union of Workers.
The illegitimate regime continued to refuse to adjudicate or otherwise resolve the
cases of thousands of employees of the state-owned oil company PDVSA who
were dismissed during and after the 2002-03 strike. The Ministry of Labor
continued to deny registration to the National Union of Oil, Gas, Petrochemical,
and Refinery Workers.
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The concept of striking, demonized since the 2002 national security law, was used
periodically as a political tool to accuse regime opponents of coup plotting or other
destabilizing activities. Some companies, especially in the public sector, had
multiple unions with varying degrees of allegiance to the ruling party’s version of
the “socialist revolution,” which could trigger interunion conflict and strife.
The OHCHR documented restrictions on labor unions through the arbitrary
detention of union leaders and five forced evictions of union headquarters. The
Venezuelan Observatory of Union Freedom documented more than 100 detentions,
most of which were arbitrary, of union leaders since 2010.
NGOs reported the illegitimate regime continued harassment of unions by
prosecuting union members in military courts. On March 31, a labor attorney was
severely beaten and taken into custody by the GNB in Barquisimeto, Lara, for
recording with his cell phone a peaceful protest of health workers who were
struggling to get gasoline ration vouchers promised by the regime.
Union leaders denounced the detention on May 8 of Bartolo Guerra, a PDVSA
tugboat captain, for criticizing the illegitimate Maduro regime. In a meeting with
the company’s leadership, workers expressed frustration regarding low salaries and
poor working conditions. According to the Federation for Oil Workers, Guerra
had worked for 40 consecutive days, and the company had not provided food or
water for employees for more than a week. Guerra blamed the misery and hunger
of workers on Maduro. When Guerra refused to retract his statements, the DGCIM
arrested him and charged him with treason.
On August 31, Ruben Gonzalez, secretary general of miners’ union
Sintraferrominera, was released after a military tribunal convicted him for
“outrage” to the armed forces and the GNB and sentenced him to five years and
nine months in prison. Union leaders described Gonzalez’ 2018 arrest and
imprisonment as part of the illegitimate regime’s efforts to eliminate the union and
install a more pliant, parallel union while a new collective agreement was
negotiated.
b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The law prohibits some forms of forced or compulsory labor but does not provide
criminal penalties for certain forms of forced labor. The law on organized crime
prohibits human trafficking by organized crime groups. It prescribes penalties
sufficient to deter human trafficking of adults carried out by a member of an
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organized-crime group of three or more individuals. The organized-crime law,
however, fails to prohibit trafficking by any individual not affiliated with such a
group. Prosecutors may employ other statutes to prosecute such individuals. The
law increases penalties for child trafficking with the purpose of forced labor.
There was no comprehensive information available regarding the illegitimate
regime’s enforcement of the law. The labor group Autonomous Front in Defense
of Employment, Wages, and Unions (FADESS) reported that public-sector worker
agreements included provisions requiring service in the armed forces’ reserves.
NGOs noted sex trafficking and forced labor in domestic service within the
country increased in 2019 (see section 7.c.).
Some doctors participating in Cuba’s overseas medical program showed indicators
of forced labor. According to FADESS, more than 60,000 Cubans worked in the
illegitimate Maduro regime’s social programs (such as the Mission Inside the
Barrio) in exchange for the regime’s provision of oil resources to the Cuban
government. FADESS noted Cubans worked in the ministries of Education,
Registrar, Notary, Telecommunications, and Security. FADESS also cited that the
G-2 Cuban security unit was present in the armed forces and in state enterprises.
The Cuban government may have forced some Cubans to participate in its
government-sponsored medical missions. Some Cuban medical personnel who
participated in the social program Mission Inside the Barrio described indicators of
forced labor, including underpayment of wages, mandatory long hours, limitations
on movement, the use of “minders” to conduct surveillance of participants outside
of work, forced political indoctrination, and threats of retaliatory actions against
workers and their families if they left the program or did not return to Cuba as
directed by government supervisors. The Cuban government acknowledged that it
withheld the passports of Cuban medical personnel in the country. Venezuelan
authorities did not investigate allegations of forced labor in Cuba’s overseas
medical program. Additionally, doctors who deserted the program reported Cuban
“minders” coerced them to indoctrinate the population into supporting the
illegitimate Maduro regime and falsify records to bolster the number of individuals
assisted.
The law does not criminalize all forms of forced or compulsory labor, and
penalties were not commensurate with those for analogous serious crimes, such as
kidnapping.
Illegal mining operations existed in some of the country’s most remote areas,
including Bolivar State, where armed groups exploited girls into sex trafficking,
forcibly recruited youth to join armed criminal groups, and forced children to work
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in mines under dangerous conditions. In 2019 the OHCHR documented instances
of forced labor, violence, and human trafficking related to mining activity in the
Mining Arc of the Orinoco River. It estimated that approximately 45 percent of
miners in Bolivar State were underage and extremely vulnerable to human
trafficking.
Also see the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at
https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.
c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment
The law prohibits all the worst forms of child labor. The law sets the minimum
employment age at 14. Children younger than 14 may work only if granted special
permission by the National Institute for Minors or the Ministry of Labor. Such
permission may not be granted to minors who are younger than the legal age for
work in hazardous occupations that risk their life or health or could damage their
intellectual or moral development. According to the ILO, the illegitimate Maduro
regime had not made publicly available the list of specific types of work
considered hazardous. Children ages 14 to 18 may not work without permission of
their legal guardians or in occupations expressly prohibited by law, and they may
work no more than six hours per day or 30 hours per week. Minors younger than
18 may not work outside the normal workday.
Anyone employing children younger than eight is subject to a prison term that is
sufficient to deter violations. Employers must notify authorities if they hire a
minor as a domestic worker. The illegitimate regime did not effectively enforce
the law. Penalties were not commensurate with those for other analogous serious
crimes, such as kidnapping.
No information was available on whether or how many employers were sanctioned
for violations. The illegitimate regime continued to provide services to vulnerable
children, including street children, working children, and children at risk of
working. There was no independent accounting of the effectiveness of these and
other illegitimate regime-supported programs.
Most child laborers worked in the agricultural sector, street vending, domestic
service, or in small and medium-size businesses, most frequently in family-run
operations. There continued to be isolated reports of children exploited in
domestic servitude, mining, forced begging, and commercial sexual exploitation
(see section 6), many of whom could be victims of trafficking. Members of the
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2020
United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

VENEZUELA

47

illegitimate Maduro regime supported the operations of the National Liberation
Army and dissidents of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia dissidents by
allowing the exploitation, sex trafficking, forced labor, and forced recruitment of
children. A study by Cecodap found that child laborers constituted up to 45
percent of those working in mines. Media reported children as young as nine years
old working in mines.
d. Discrimination with Respect to Employment and Occupation
The constitution prohibits employment discrimination of every citizen. The law
prohibits discrimination based on age, race, sex, social condition, creed, marital
status, union affiliation, political views, nationality, disability, or any condition that
could be used to lessen the principle of equality before the law. No law
specifically prohibits employment discrimination based on sexual orientation,
gender identity, or HIV/AIDS status. Media and NGOs, such as PROVEA and the
Human Rights Center at the Andres Bello Catholic University, reported the
illegitimate Maduro regime did not effectively enforce applicable law, and
penalties were not commensurate to law related to civil rights, such as election
interference.
NGOs reported public employees faced discrimination and harassment for their
political beliefs or activities. According to Aula Abierta, 4,876 public servants
were dismissed from their jobs for political reasons in 2018.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The illegitimate Maduro regime raised the national minimum wage, but it
remained below the poverty line. Labor experts noted the unilateral nature of the
decision contravened ILO Convention No. 26 requiring the government to consult
with employers and workers prior to enacting wage increases. Legislators noted
the decree violated the law, since it supplanted collective bargaining agreements.
Union leaders from the petroleum, health, telecommunications, and electricity
sectors highlighted that the wage-raise decree did not include wage adjustments to
keep up with hyperinflation and thus remained insufficient to afford the basic food
basket. The decree also violated the law by nullifying previously signed collective
bargaining agreements, including wage tables that scaled salaries to account for
seniority and merit pay.
The trade union of the industrial sector stated that fewer than 2,000 of the 15,000
industries existing in 2000 remained as of May.
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The law sets the workweek at 40 hours (35 hours for a night shift). The law
establishes separate limits for “shift workers,” who may not work more than an
average of 42 hours per week during an eight-week period, with overtime capped
at 100 hours annually. Managers are prohibited from obligating employees to
work additional time, and workers have the right to two consecutive days off each
week. Overtime is paid at a 50 percent surcharge if a labor inspector approves the
overtime in advance and at a 100 percent surcharge if an inspector does not give
advance permission. The law establishes that after completing one year with an
employer, a worker has a right to 15 days of paid vacation annually. A worker has
the right to an additional day for every additional year of service, for a maximum
of 15 additional days annually.
The law provides for secure, hygienic, and adequate working conditions.
Workplaces must maintain “protection for the health and life of the workers
against all dangerous working conditions.” The law obligates employers to pay
workers specified amounts for workplace injuries or occupational illnesses,
ranging from two times the daily salary for missed workdays to several years’
salary for permanent injuries. Workers may remove themselves from situations
that endanger health or safety without jeopardy to their employment. Occupational
safety and health (OSH) were not appropriate for the main industries in the
country, and workers were not able to remove themselves from situations that
endangered health or safety without jeopardy to their employment. The
illegitimate Maduro regime did not effectively enforce OSH law. Penalties for
OSH law violations were not commensurate with those for crimes, such as
negligence.
The law covers all workers, including temporary, occasional, and domestic
workers. There was reportedly some enforcement by the Ministry of Labor of
minimum wage rates and hours of work provisions in the formal sector, but an
estimated 40 percent of the population worked in the informal sector, where labor
law and protections generally were not enforced. There was no publicly available
information regarding the number of inspectors or the frequency of inspections to
implement health and safety, minimum wage, or hours of work provisions.
Ministry inspectors seldom closed unsafe job sites. Official statistics regarding
workplace deaths and injuries were not publicly available.
Health workers were severely exposed to COVID-19 due to the lack of personal
protective equipment. The illegitimate Maduro regime cracked down on medical
professionals who spoke about the realities they faced in their work.
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NGOs and media reported hazardous conditions in mining areas, many of which
operated illegally and exposed miners to injury, disease, and mercury poisoning.
The OHCHR documented high levels of violence and human rights violations
perpetrated by armed groups and illegitimate Maduro regime security forces who
fought for control over mining territory. NGOs reported the use of beatings,
mutilation, disappearances, and killings by armed groups to enforce control in
mining areas.

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2020
United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

